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A	crisis	made	in	Italy
The	decision	of	Italy’s	President,	Sergio	Mattarella,	to	veto	Giuseppe	Conte’s	choice	of	finance	minister
prompted	much	discussion	about	the	legitimacy	of	Mattarella’s	actions	and	the	impact	Italy’s
membership	of	the	Eurozone	has	on	the	country’s	democracy.	Michael	Wilkinson	argues	that	however
much	the	pressure	on	Italy	appeared	to	stem	from	global	financial	markets	or	European	constitutional
conventions,	it	was	still	a	fundamentally	domestic	political	crisis	made	in	Italy.
The	recent	crisis	surrounding	the	Italian	President’s	refusal	to	appoint	a	Finance	Minister	considered	likely	to	pursue
an	agenda	of	‘Italexit’	has	sparked	a	great	deal	of	constitutional	commentary.	Two	particular	threads	of	opinion	are
identified	here	and	some	doubts	cast	about	them.	On	the	one	hand,	there	are	those	who	consider	legitimate	the
President’s	discretionary	use	of	power,	partly	in	light	of	the	pressure	that	would	be	brought	to	bear	by	the	financial
markets	should	Italy	opt	for	exiting	the	single	currency.	On	the	other	hand,	there	are	those	who	doubt	its	wisdom,
and	offer	a	broader	indictment	of	the	pressure	brought	to	bear	on	the	Italian	government	as	a	result	of	being	in	an
overly	rigid	Eurozone.	This	gets	closer	to	diagnosing	the	condition,	but	in	its	ambiguity	about	the	pressure	point,	fails
to	underscore	that	this	is	essentially	a	crisis	made	in	Italy,	and,	if	at	all,	to	be	resolved	there,	including	a	full	and	frank
debate	about	membership	of	the	single	currency	and	even	the	European	Union.
At	the	President’s	discretion?
The	President’s	actions	have	been	justified	on	the	basis	of	his	discretionary	power	under	Article	92	of	the	Italian
Constitution	to	appoint	–	and	therefore	reject	–	Ministers,	which	can	be	exercised	with	relatively	few	fetters.	To	rely
on	this	alone,	however,	would	be	to	run	the	risk	of	conflating	legality	with	legitimacy,	suggesting	the	President	should
do	what	he	is	legally	empowered	to	do.	But	‘may’	obviously	does	not	imply	‘should’.	And	there	are	sound	political
constitutional	reasons	for	opposing	the	emergence	of	a	convention	that	would	augment	the	presidential	power	of
veto	over	political	appointments.
The	text,	or	subtext,	however,	is	material,	a	fear	of	how	the	financial	markets	would	react	to	a	fragile	economy	that
dared	to	question	the	shibboleth	of	European	integration,	the	single	currency,	and	the	order	that	supports	it.	The
specific	fear	is	that	the	economic	damage	such	agenda	would	cause	to	the	country’s	finances	would	price	out
protection	of	precisely	those	constitutional	values	cherished	in	the	Italian	republic.
This	is	a	peculiar	justification	given	the	notorious	volatility	of	the	financial	markets,	the	same	markets	that	saw	an
extraordinary	convergence	in	yields	in	the	decade	preceding	the	financial	crisis,	only	to	combust	in	the	aftermath	of
the	financial	meltdown,	to	then	be	calmed	by	Draghi’s	‘whatever	it	takes	speech’,	based	on	a	‘myth’	of	irreversibility
of	the	euro,	contested	in	Karlsruhe	but	sustained	in	Luxembourg.	In	any	case,	as	Mark	Blyth	has	shown,	there	is	little
to	suggest	that	the	markets	reward	fiscal	discipline	or	austerity	as	such,	unsurprisingly	given	its	contractionary
effects.	Ironically,	but	not	that	unpredictably,	the	markets	reacted	badly	to	the	President’s	gambit	because	all	it	did
was	to	prolong	(for	a	brief	period)	the	uncertainty,	possibly	exacerbating	the	situation	in	July	elections,	with	the
League	in	particular	looking	set	to	profit.	The	end	result,	again,	is	a	fudge,	Savona,	without	apparent	irony,	now
taking	the	position	of	Minister	of	European	Affairs.	Only	time	will	tell	if	the	fudge	will	stick.
Underlying	the	justification	is	not	only	that	politicians	should	act	prudently	in	the	interests	of	financial	stability,	but	that
democratically	legitimated	choices	should	be	thwarted	in	advance,	to	pre-empt	possible	future	market	reaction.	The
implicit	assumption	is	that	‘the	market’	is	an	impersonal,	natural	force	like	an	earthquake,	or	a	divine	entity	that	must
be	suitably	appeased.	This	obfuscates	the	fact	that	market	pressure	is	brought	to	bear	by	human	agents	and	political
institutions.	More	fundamentally,	it	elides	the	reasons	market	rationality	looms	so	large	in	the	Eurozone.	To	explore
this,	one	needs	to	probe	further	into	the	background,	which	is	neither	divine,	nor	natural,	but	constitutional.
De-constitutionalisation
Dani	and	Menendez	thus	identify	the	pressure	to	appoint	(or	reject)	particular	ministers	as	coming	not	from	‘the
markets’	but	from	European	constitutional	law.	From	this	perspective,	they	argue	that	the	dilemma	facing	a
prospective	Italian	government	was	one	identified	earlier	by	Dieter	Grimm,	namely	that	the	EU	in	general,	and	EMU,
in	particular,	is	‘over-constitutionalised’,	leaving	insufficient	room	for	political	manoeuvre	at	the	national	level.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: A crisis made in Italy Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-06-15
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/06/15/a-crisis-made-in-italy/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
‘European	law,	as	interpreted	by	the	European	Court	of	Justice	and…	as	practised	in	the	context	of	the	European
economic	government,	ties	with	the	golden	fetters	of	the	euro	the	hands	of	national	governments,	rendering	hopeless
the	task	of	removing	the	obstacles	to	the	realization	of	substantive	equality,	as	required	by	the	Italian	(and	other)
constitutions.‘
It	is	indisputable	that	EMU,	understood	not	just	as	a	constitutional	text,	but	as	a	constitutional	practice	(including	the
dubious	Euro-crisis	law	and	politics	associated	with	it),	has	imposed	extraordinary	constraints	on	participating
governments.	These	might	even	be	described	as	supra-constitutional,	given	their	ideological	weight	as	part	of	a	TINA
narrative,	and	their	ability	to	pressure	even	the	constituent	power	of	the	people.	It	should	thus	be	noted	that	the
constraints	are	in	a	significant	manner	de-constitutionalised,	as	close	scrutiny	of	the	European	Central	Bank	and	the
‘formally	informal’	Euro-group	during	the	Greek-crisis	would	reveal.
In	any	case,	the	material	reality	of	the	constraints	are	beyond	doubt.	It	is	their	constitutional	identity	that	is	more
ambiguous.	Is	this	a	European	or	a	domestic	constitutional	convention?	Where	ultimately	does	over-
constitutionalisation	take	place?	Dani	and	Menendez	are	clear	that	‘European	law	does	not	impose	any	policy
requirement	for	the	Minister	of	the	Economy	sitting	in	the	ECOFIN	and	the	Eurogroup’.	And	aside	from	some	unwise
but	rather	inconsequential	comments	from	Juncker	and	Oettinger,	the	EU	institutions	have	remained	publically	mute
in	the	face	of	the	Italian	predicament,	as	has	the	German	government.	So	instead,	they	reinterpret	the	constraint	as	a
constitutional	convention,	‘according	to	which	political	parties	or	coalitions	that	are	critical	of	the	existing	economic
and	monetary	arrangements	within	the	Eurozone	cannot	get	into	government‘.	In	their	view,	this	amounts	to	a	new
form	of	‘authoritarian	liberalism,	in	which	the	preservation	of	monetary	and	financial	stability	trumps	democracy’.
Dani	and	Menendez	seem	inclined	to	present	this	as	a	feature	of	EU	law	and	practice	only	so	they	can	then	reject	it
as	such.	But	presenting	the	dilemma	as	primarily	a	matter	of	European	constitutional	law	(or	convention)	threatens	to
lead	to	the	usual	impasse,	adorned	with	the	same,	tired,	insistence	that	this	is	a	European	problem	which	requires	a
European	solution.	Although	perhaps	impeccable	as	a	matter	of	normative	logic,	this	fails	as	a	matter	of
constitutional	analysis.	By	placing	its	faith	in	reform	of	a	Eurozone	that	looks	highly	resistant,	if	not	immune	to	such
change,	it	is	also	doubtful	as	constitutional	strategy.
This	is	a	domestic	constitutional	crisis
However	much	the	pressure	on	Italy	appears	to	be	brought	to	bear	by	global	financial	markets	or	European
constitutional	conventions,	this	is	a	domestic	constitutional	crisis.	It	is	made	in	Italy.	Full	reflection	not	just	on	this
episode	but	on	the	broader	Italian	political	situation	suggests	a	crisis	of	the	material	constitution.	This	is	similar	to
what	Gramsci	called	an	‘organic	crisis’,	the	inability	of	the	ruling	bloc	(made	up	of	broadly	centrist	parties	and
institutions)	to	maintain	positional	and	ideological	hegemony.	This	encompasses	‘the	totality	of	a	system	that,	for
whatever	reason,	is	no	longer	able	to	generate	societal	consensus…	Organic	crises	are	at	once	economic,	political,
social,	and	ideological	–	in	Gramscian	terms,	they	are	crises	of	hegemony	–	and	they	usually	lead	to	a	rejection	of
established	political	parties,	economic	policies,	and	value	systems.’
The	claim	must	not	be	misunderstood.	The	problems	faced	by	Italy	are	repeated	elsewhere	in	Europe,	and	beyond.
Material	constitutional	crises	play	out	across	the	Continent	in	different	ways,	with	anti-establishment	parties	on	the
rise	almost	everywhere,	in	creditor	as	well	as	debtor	countries.	Neither	is	it	to	ignore	the	geopolitical	and	institutional
pressures	that	are	placed	in	a	Euro-zone	that	increasingly	resembles	a	hegemonic	federation,	with	a	dominant
neoliberal	ideology.	The	problems,	in	other	words,	are	systemic,	and	intertwined.	But	that	makes	it	all	the	more
necessary	to	zoom	in	on	the	proximate	constitutional	cause.
The	postwar	settlement	in	Europe	includes	a	dominant	constitutional	idea,	which	is	that	participation	in	the	project	of
integration	and	by	extension	the	single	currency	is	a	constitutional	essential,	a	conditio	sine	qua	non	of	respectable
constitutional	opinion.	It	is	here	that	Dani	and	Menendez	have	hit	on	the	important	point,	suggesting	an	analogy	with
the	pactum	ad	excludendum	that	put	communist	parties	beyond	the	pale.
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But	this	is	a	feature	of	the	domestic	constitutional	imagination,	backed	by	domestic	constitutional	norms.	Dani	and
Menendez	imply	as	much	because	they	consider	that	it	might	be	overcome	by	appealing	to	another	constitutional
essential,	Italy’s	‘democratic	republic	founded	on	labour’.	This,	however,	risks	offering	another	overly-constitutional
solution,	swapping	one	form	of	authoritarianism	for	a	different,	more	palatable	variety.	The	only	way	out	of	the
impasse	lies	in	and	through	democracy,	and,	more	fundamentally	still,	in	social	movements	and	their	translation	into
progressive	political	and	constitutional	goals.	This,	at	the	present	moment,	can	only	occur	domestically.	And	it	must
address	the	shibboleth	of	the	single	currency	and	even	European	integration	itself.	There	should	be	no
underestimating	the	challenge.
Authoritarian	liberalism
Here	a	final	point	about	Italy	is	worth	raising.	In	most	other	contexts,	as	the	‘extreme	centre’	disintegrates	in	Europe
(and	elsewhere),	there	has	been	a	revival	of	new	formations	across	the	political	spectrum	–	centre,	left	and	right.
‘Pasokification’	is	already	into	its	second	round	in	Italy,	with	the	decline	of	the	Democratic	Party	of	Renzi	at	the
March	elections.	The	Italian	reaction,	however,	seems	in	danger	of	leaning	in	an	unmitigated	illiberal	direction,
witness	the	unopposed	part	of	the	coalition	agreement	on	the	expulsion	of	half	a	million	irregular	migrants.	Is	this
because	the	terrain	of	contestation	not	just	of	EU	policies,	but,	we	must	add,	of	the	European	political	project,	has
been	almost	totally	vacated	by	the	left?
Elsewhere,	I	have	elaborated	on	the	phenomenon	of	authoritarian	liberalism,	first	coined	by	German	Social
Democratic	Hermann	Heller	in	the	interwar	years,	representing	the	combination	of	politically	authoritarian	means	to
achieve	ostensibly	economically	liberal	ends.	This	must	now	include	maintenance	of	a	single	currency	with	the	free
circulation	of	capital	but	with	clear	winners	and	losers,	raising	inequality	both	within	and	between	nations.	Over-
constitutionalisation	of	a	neo-	and	ordo-liberal	kind	has	certainly	contributed	to	the	de-democratisation	of	the
economy	and	to	the	various	malaises	in	Europe	over	the	last	few	decades,	accelerating	since	the	Euro-crisis.	But	it	is
a	mistake	to	think	that	constitutionalisation	of	a	different	kind	would	be	a	cure	for	the	patient.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	the	verfassungsblog.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of
EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Angelo
Amboldi	(CC	BY-ND	2.0)
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